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L INTRODUCTION
For many years, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that an
employer, or workmen's compensation insurance carrier, is not lia-
ble for further medical expenses after an employee has been ad-
judged permanently disabled, i.e., it has been determined that any
further treatment will not cure or improve the employee's condi-
tion.' The court has also held that nursing services performed by
the spouse of the disabled employee are not compensable2 under
the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 Spiker v. John Day Co.
4 has
recently changed both of these rules.
II. THE DECISION
On August 11, 1971, Harold Spiker, while traveling as a sales-
man for the John Day Co., was involved in a car accident which left
him totally and permanently disabled. Mr. Spiker's hospital and
medical bills were paid by his employer and insurance carrier
through March 3, 1972. After that date, all further compensation
for medical expenses was denied even though the employer and
insurance carrier were aware that continuous custodial care, ei-
ther at home or in a nursing home, would be required for the re-
mainder of Mr. Spiker's life. To reduce the expense of this care,
1. Halbert v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 Neb. 775, 178 N.W.2d 781 (1970);
Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 57 N.W.2d 387 (1952); Paulsen v.
Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N.W.2d 11 (1947); Wilson v. Brown-
McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
2. Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
3. NEB. RFv. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
4. 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978).
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Mrs. Spiker herself provided a great deal of it in their home.5
In Spiker v. John Day Co.,6 the Nebraska Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether the Nebraska Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act requires an employer to provide medical treatments
which will not cure or improve a disabled employee.7 The court
held that medical services shall be provided by the employer as
they are required by the employee.8 The dissenting opinion de-
clared that recovery for medical treatment that will not cure or im-
prove the employee was not available under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as it existed on the date of Mr. Spiker's accident
and was clearly opposed to prior Nebraska case law.9
The court was also asked to decide whether, under the Act,
compensation could be paid for the medical services which were
provided by the employee's wife. The majority overruled the long-
standing rule of Claus v. DeVere'0 in order to allow recovery for
the services provided by Mrs. Spiker." The dissent labeled this
action a bit of judicial legislation.12 It expressed the opinion that a
rule which has stood unchallenged for forty-seven years should
not be changed by the court; such a change should be a legislative
decision.
13
IlL RELIEVE OR CURE?
The automobile accident which permanently disabled the plain-
tiff, Mr. Spiker,14 arose out of and in the course of his employment
with the defendant, John Day Co.'5 The compensation court found
that plaintiff sustained cerebral trauma at the time of the accident
which resulted in chronic focal organic brain syndrome with be-
havioral disorder.'6 On rehearing, the compensation court found
that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled as a result of
the brain injury and would require custodial or nursing home care
for the remainder of his life.' 7 It awarded an amount equivalent to
5. Id. at 518, 270 N.W.2d at 308.
6. 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978).
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
8. 201 Neb. at 511, 270 N.W.2d at 305.
9. Id. at 524, 270 N.W.2d at 311. (White, C. J., joined by Spencer & Clinton, J. J.).
10. 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
11. 201 Neb. at 512, 270 N.W.2d at 305.
12. Id. at 529, 270 N.W.2d at 313.
13. Id.
14. Mrs. Spiker was substituted as the plaintiff after being appointed conservator
for Mr. Spiker on March 21, 1977. However, Mr. Spiker will still be referred to
as the plaintiff.
15. 201 Neb. at 504, 270 N.W.2d at 302.
16. Id. at 504-05, 270 N.W.2d at 302.
17. Id. at 505, 270 N.W.2d at 302.
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the cost of this care for the time plaintiff was cared for by Mrs.
Spiker.18 The issue presented upon appeal was whether an em-
ployee who is totally and permanently disabled as a result of an
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment may re-
cover the cost of medical and nursing care which does not lessen
or cure the disability.19
The employee's sole recovery against his employer in this case,
as in any other workmen's compensation case, is that allowed
under the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act 2 0 in effect at
the time of the injury. The Act, as it existed at the time of plain-
tiff's injury, specifically provided:
The employer shall be liable for reasonable medical and hospital serv-
ices and medicines as and when needed, and in addition to devices neces-
sary for treatment, the first prosthetic devices, subject to the approval of
the compensation court, not to exceed the regular charge made for such
service in similar cases ....
The court shall have the authority to determine the necessity, charac-
ter, and sufficiency of any medical services furnished or to be furnished
21
The statute did not specify that the services or medicines must
cure or improve the condition of the injured employee before the
employer would be required to provide them. The statute merely
required that they be provided "as and when needed.., subject to
the approval of the compensation court."22
Even though Nebraska is catalogued2 3 as a state which does not
allow medical benefits under workmen's compensation when the
treatment will merely maintain rather than cure the employee, a
review of Nebraska case law demonstrates that such benefits have
been discreetly allowed in some cases. 24 In Gilmore v. State,
25
plaintiff was totally disabled as a result of a compensable injury.
The court allowed recovery for all accident related medical ex-
penses incurred up to the time of his death.26 The court deter-
mined only that the expenses were accident related, reasonable,
and necessary, as a result of the injury.27 There was no discussion
18. Id.
19. Id. at 506, 270 N.W.2d at 303.
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 2 A. LARsON, THE LAw OF WOMCIuEN'S COMPENSATION § 61.14 at 10-476 (1976).
24. Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971); Gil-
more v. State, 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
25. 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
26. Id. at 651-52, 20 N.W.2d at 920.
27. Id.
19791
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regarding whether any of the services or medicines improved the
condition of the employee.
In Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 2 8 plaintiff sustained per-
manent partial injuries as a result of a work-related accident. The
court acknowledged that his condition would continue to deterio-
rate with time and that medical services would be required for the
rest of his life.29 Even though there was no indication that such
medical services would improve the condition of the plaintiff, the
court held: 'The undisputed evidence indicates plaintiff will re-
quire medicines, and medical and hospital services in the future as
a result of his injuries. If and when such items are required, they
shall, subject to approval by the compensation court, be supplied
at defendants' expense."3 0 Chief Justice White joined in the dis-
sent in Shotwell.31 This dissenting opinion, however, was based
upon grounds entirely different than those on which White dis-
sented in Spiker.32 The Shotwell dissent did not object on the
ground that medical expenses were allowed for treatment which
would merely maintain or relieve rather than improve or cure. On
the contrary, it was based solely on the fact that plaintiff was held
to be only partially disabled rather than totally disabled.33 Appar-
ently, even White approved payment of medical expenses in this
instance. If allowing recovery for medical treatments which
merely maintain is judicial legislation, as implied in the Spiker dis-
sent,3 4 the court has been legislating for quite some time.
The cases cited by the defendant and the dissent in Spiker as
controling3 5 held that medical treatments which will not necessar-
ily improve the condition of the injured employee, or those from
which the possibility of any improvement would be merely conjec-
tural, are not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation
Act.36 However, these cases 37 did not deal with treatments which
were necessary to maintain life, as was the case with Mr. Spiker;
28. 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971).
29. Id. at 322, 190 N.W.2d at 626.
30. Id. at 323-24, 190 N.W.2d at 627.
31. Id. at 324, 190 N.W.2d at 627 (Spencer, J., dissenting).
32. 201 Neb. at 524, 270 N.W.2d at 311 (White, C.J., dissenting).
33. 187 Neb. at 324, 190 N.W.2d at 627.
34. 201 Neb. at 524, 270 N.W.2d at 311.
35. Halbert v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 Neb. 775, 178 N.W.2d 781 (1970);
Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 57 N.W.2d 387 (1952); Paulsen v.
Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N.W.2d 11 (1947); Wilson v. Brown-
McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
37. Halbert v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 Neb. 775, 178 N.W.2d 781 (1970);
Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 57 N.W.2d 387 (1952); Paulsen v.
Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N.W.2d 11 (1947); Wilson v. Brown-
McDonald, Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N.W. 254 (1938).
[Vol. 58:565
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
rather, they dealt with treatments which were apparently elective,
of which the result was uncertain. Even after the court stated that
treatment would not be compensable if no improvement was ex-
pected, compensation was allowed in some cases.38 Contrary to
the dissent's contention, the court did not take a very big leap in
allowing recovery for Mr. Spiker's medical expenses after it was
determined that he was permanently and totally disabled.
Since in prior decisions the Nebraska Supreme Court had al-
lowed compensation for accident-related medical treatments of the
type required by Mr. Spiker for the remainder of his life,3 9 the
Spiker decision could have rested on those cases alone. Neverthe-
less, the court went on to review the relevant case law in several
other jurisdictions. Most of the cases turned on the interpretation
of the words "cure and/or relieve" as taken from either state stat-
ute or common law.4o The court then combined the interpretations
of the words "relieve and/or cure" from other jurisdictions with its
own determination that the recovery for future medical expenses
in Shotwell was not dependent upon the hope for a cure and de-
cided that the nursing care required by Mr. Spiker as a direct re-
sult of his accident was compensable 4 ' under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.4 2
The majority of other jurisdictions which have faced the ques-
tion have held that "cure" and "relieve" have separate and distinct
meanings.4 3 Since both words were used by the legislature or the
court, each must be given effect. Therefore, treatment may be
compensable even though it only relieves the injured employee
38. Halbert v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 Neb. 775, 178 N.W.2d 781 (1970)
(expense of additional surgery was allowed because, although unsuccessful,
there was reason to believe it would be effective and plaintiffs doctor felt it
was necessary); Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233,57 N.W.2d 387 (1952)
(defendant required to pay all medical expenses incurred to the time of trial
even though treatments did not necessarily help plaintiff's condition and doc-
tors had told plaintiff to return to work earlier).
39. Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971); Gil-
more v. State, 146 Neb. 647, 20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
40. W. J. Newman Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 Ill. 190,187 N.E. 137 (1933); Castle
v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 51 N.W.2d 370 (1952); Stephens v. Crane
Trucking, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1969); Brollier v. Van Alstine, 236 Mo. App.
1233, 163 S.W.2d 109 (1942); Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., 40 N.J.
Super. 564, 123 A.2d 815 (1956), aff'd, 25 N.J. 72, 135 A.2d 161 (1957); Orrick
Stone Co. v. Jeffries, 488 P.2d 1243 (Okla. 1971).
41. 201 Neb. at 511, 270 N.W.2d at 305.
42. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
43. W. J. Newman Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 Ill 190,187 N.E. 137 (1933); Cas-
tle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502,51 N.W.2d 370 (1952); Stephens v. Crane
Trucking, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1969); Brollier v. Van Alstine, 236 Mo. App.
1233, 163 S.W.2d 109 (1942); Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., 40 N.J.
Super. 564, 123 A.2d 815 (1956), aJ'd, 25 N.J. 72, 135 A.2d 161 (1957).
1979]
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from the effects of his or her injury and does not take any step
toward a cure.
The requirement that the services or medicines must "relieve
or cure" in order to be compensable does not appear in the Work-
men's Compensation Act44 and was apparently added to Nebraska
law as an additional hurdle, or stepping stone, for the injured em-
ployee in Newberry v. Youngs.45 In Newberry, plaintiff claimed
payment for a pair of eyeglasses which were broken in the com-
pensable accident. The court held:
Need for eyeglasses is not the test. The burden placed upon the em-
ployer by [the Act] is designed to relieve or cure the physical injuries suf-
fered by the employee. We see no more reason to require the defendant
to pay for eyeglasses under the circumstances here than there would be to
pay the cost of cleaning or repairing clothing soiled or torn in an acci-
dent.4 6
It would appear from this passage that the court intended to
limit recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act4 7 to that
necessitated because of the "physical injuries suffered by the em-
ployee."' ' It did not intend, nor did it anticipate, that the words
"relieve or cure" would be taken out of their original context and
interpreted either narrowly or broadly to contract or expand the
recovery allowed under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In
Spiker, the court pulled the words "relieve or cure" out of the con-
text in which they had been used in Newberry, attributed to them
the meaning that other jurisdictions had given them, and arrived at
the same result they could have reached through more traditional
means.
The result reached by the court also appears to be appropriate
under the language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which
specifies: "The employer shall be liable for reasonable medical and
hospital services and medicines as and when needed .... "4 The
language of the statute in no way limits compensable services to
those reasonably certain to cure or improve the condition of the
injured employee. Chief Justice White claimed in his dissenting
opinion, however, "[u]nder no reasonable construction or inter-
pretation of this statute can it be said that the employer is liable
for purely custodial care of the injured employee, which will do
nothing to improve his injured condition."50 He concluded his dis-
44. For text of NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978), see text
accompanying note 21 supra.
45. 163 Neb. 397, 80 N.W.2d 165 (1956).
46. Id. at 405, 80 N.W.2d at 170.
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Issue 1943) (amended 1978).
48. 163 Neb. at 405, 80 N.W.2d at 170.
49. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
50. 201 Neb. at 528, 270 N.W.2d at 313.
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sent by stating, "Under the guise of judicial interpretation, the ma-
jority opinion has rewritten and liberalized recovery under the
workmen's compensation laws. If such a result is desirable, the
responsibility for the nature and amount of benefits accorded to
the injured employee rests with the Legislature."Sl
Subsequent to Mr. Spiker's accident in 1971 but prior to the re-
lease of the supreme court's decision, the legislature amended the
Workman's Compensation Act to read:
The employer shall be liable for all reasonable medical, surgical, and hos-
pital services. . .and medicines as and when needed, which are required
by the nature of the injury and which will relieve pain or promote and
hasten the employee's restoration to health and employment... subject to
the approval of and regulation by the compensation court, not to exceed
the regular charge made for such service in similar cases.
5 2
Although such recovery was not precluded under the former stat-
ute, the amendment affirmatively provided for compensation for
services and medicines which only maintain or relieve the pain of
an injured employee.
53
IV. NURSING SERVICES PROVIDED BY A SPOUSE
The second major issue faced by the court in Spiker was
whether an injured employee could recover for nursing services
provided by the employee's spouse.54 The long-standing rule55 in
Nebraska that these services were not compensable was overruled
in Spiker and the recovery was allowed.56
Subsequent to the termination of medical payments by defend-
ant's insurer on March 3, 1972, Mrs. Spiker provided a great deal of
her husband's care in their home. She spent a total of 3,371 hours
over 171 days taking care of him. The care provided by Mrs.
Spiker included turning her husband at least once an hour during
the night, administering medication and inserting catheters when
51. Id. at 531, 270 N.W.2d at 314.
52. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-120 (Cum- Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
53. Although this amendment is helpful in clarifying that an injured employee
will be compensated for his continuing medical needs even if such treat-
ments will not improve his overall condition, its application may raise
problems. There may be treatments which will relieve pain but which have
not been recommended by the employee's physician or which do not neces-
sarily fall into the definition of "medical services," e.g., backrubs. Are these
services which may be compensated under the statute as amended? Hov-
ever, since the statute does specify "medical, surgical and hospital services
... which are required by the nature of the injury and which will relieve
pain," the compensation court should be able to control any possible abuse of
this provision.
54. 201 Neb. at 517, 270 N.W.2d at 308.
55. Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
56. 201 Neb. at 512, 270 N.W.2d at 305.
1979]
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necessary, changing bedding after bowel movements and taking
care of him completely on nights and weekends. Mrs. Spiker was
not a professional nurse. A nurse was employed to carry out these
functions during the weekdays. Reduction of cost was the reason
stated by Mrs. Spiker for performing these services herself.
57
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act in effect at the
time of Mr. Spiker's accident required that the employer pay for
"reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines as and
when needed."5 8 Although this statute did not specifically state
that an employer was liable for nursing services, the court came to
the conclusion that these services were covered under the Act:
"There is little question that under either the original statute or
the subsequent amendment, nursing services, as such, are covered
as reasonable medical services."59 The court pointed out its belief
that there should be no difference in effect between those statutes
that specify "nursing services" and those that merely refer to
"medical services. '60 Therefore, the only remaining question was
whether there may be recovery when a wife has provided these
services.
Although the jurisdictions are divided on the question of
whether compensation should be paid for nursing services pro-
vided by a spouse, the modem trend appears to be to allow recov-
ery.61 For many years, Claus v. DeVere62 has stood as the rule in
Nebraska. It held that nursing services performed by a wife are
not compensable:
The rule is that the husband is entitled to the services of the wife. He is
not liable to her; nor could she sue and recover from him for any service
rendered him as a wife and a member of his household. . . . If defendant's
wife had been a professional nurse, carrying on her separate profession,
and was called as a nurse to care for her husband in a hospital where she
was employed, or from her work in the hospital to care for him in his
home, a different question would be presented.
6 3
Claus did indicate that a wife's nursing services may be compensa-
ble in certain limited circumstances, such as when the wife is a
professional nurse and specifically hired to care for her husband.64
The most common argument for denying recovery for a wife's
nursing services is that the husband is entitled to the services of
the wife-they are merely a part of her marital obligation.6 5 Other
57. Id. at 518, 270 N.W.2d at 308.
58. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
59. 201 Neb. at 516-17, 270 N.W.2d at 308.
60. Id. at 517, 270 N.W.2d at 308.
61. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 61.13, at 10-469 to -472.
62. 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
63. Id. at 818, 235 N.W. at 453.
64. Id.
65. See Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting Co., 103 Conn. 431, 130 A. 705 (1925) (indi-
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courts have phrased the arguments for denying recovery differ-
ently. Some have said it is the legal duty of the wife to care for her
husband 66 one court has held that these are services that any con-
scientious wife would give.67 Some have stated that since the serv-
ices of a spouse or another member of the household are generally
gratuitous, there must be notice that the services are not being
rendered gratuitously before the employer will be required to pay
for them.68 There are even some courts which have spoken of de-
nying recovery on the basis of statutory language which requires
the employer to pay only the "expense" of medical services.69 The
husband is not liable to his wife for the services rendered, accord-
ingly, there is no expense.
The Spiker majority cited several cases from this jurisdiction
and others for the proposition that the services of a spouse were
not compensable because "the care rendered was not so unusual
or extraordinary from normal household duties as to be compensa-
ble. 70 This is a reason used in some jurisdictions when denying
recovery in a particular instanceY This reason is only used,
though, after the court has determined that the nursing services of
cating that recovery would have been allowed if the services provided by the
wife would otherwise have required a professional nurse, but assumed no
further professional care was required after the husband was released from
the hospital; therefore, the services performed by the wife were assumed to
be those normally imposed by the marital obligation). See also Claus v.
DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 818, 235 N.W. 450, 453 (1931).
66. Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting Co., 103 Conn. 431, 130 A. 705 (1925), held that
the possible legal duty to care for an injured spouse is not applicable when
the employer has a statutory duty to pay medical expenses. See also A.G.
Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A.2d 252 (1962); Collins v.
Reed-Harlin Grocery Co., 230 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App. 1950); Transport Ins. Co. v.
Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966).
67. Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69, 228 N.W.2d 205 (1975), held that the
fact that a conscientious wife would perform nursing services does not re-
lieve the employer of his duty to provide such services.
68. California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comra'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
417,190 P.2d 990 (1948); Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting Co., 103 Conn. 431,130
A. 705 (1925).
69. Dunaj v. Harry Becker Co., 52 Mich. App. 354, 217 N.W.2d 397 (1974); Graf v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Minn. 485,49 N.W.2d 797 (1951); Transport Ins.
Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966); Western Alliance, Inc. v. Tubbs, 400
S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
70. 201 Neb. at 522-23, 270 N.W.2d at 310.
71. Galway v. Doody Steel Erecting Co., 103 Conn. 431, 130 A. 705 (1925) (court
assumed that since husband sent home from hospital, no extraordinary care
required); South Coast Constr. Co. v. Chizauskas, 172 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1965).
Cf. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Weaver, 226 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1969) (recov-
ery for hired unlicensed practical nurse reduced by one-half upon determina-
tion that approximately one-half of her time was spent on normal household
duties).
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the spouse would be compensable, but that in this particular in-
stance no nursing services were rendered.
Just as there are a variety of arguments for denying compensa-
tion for nursing services provided by a spouse, there are also a va-
riety of reasons for granting such recovery. The concurring
opinion in Spiker72 reviewed the many reasons and based its hold-
ing allowing recovery for the nursing services provided by Mrs.
Spiker on a combination of them. Several cases which have al-
lowed compensation for services provided by a spouse have con-
sidered the fact that the employer knew that such services were
required and failed to otherwise provide them.7 3 In this way, the
employer is sometimes said to have waived its statutory right to
designate who is to perform the services. 7 4
It has also been held that, rather than waiving the right to desig-
nate who is to perform the services, the employer and insurer have
actually employed the spouse.7 5 The doctor who asked the spouse
to provide the services and gave the necessary instruction was
held to be the agent of the employer and insurer. This would ap-
pear to be a fiction which, as long as the employer knows of the
need and fails to fulfill it, is not necessary. Since it is the em-
ployer's duty to provide all medical services necessary as a result
of the compensable accident, if a spouse performs the services, re-
covery should be allowed.
Another primary consideration cited by many courts when al-
lowing compensation for services performed by a spouse is that
such services were extraordinary-they were above and beyond
the services normally provided or contemplated in a marriage.7 6
This consideration seems to serve a two-fold purpose. It is first
stated as a reason for granting recovery for nursing services pro-
vided by a spouse.7 7 Second, it is used to limit the recovery actu-
72. 201 Neb. at 515, 270 N.W.2d 307 (Brodkey, J., concurring).
73. California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
417, 190 P.2d 990 (1948); Stephens v. Crane Trucking, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.
1969); Collins v. Reed-Harlin Grocery Co., 230 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App. 1950);
Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966).
74. Balsamo v. Fisher Body Div.-Gen. Motors Corp., 481 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App.
1972).
75. California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
417, 190 P.2d 990 (1948).
76. California Cas. Indern. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
417, 190 P.2d 990 (1948); Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1961);
A.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A.2d 252 (1962);
Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69, 228 N.W.2d 205 (1975); Stephens v.
Crane Trucking, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1969); Balsamo v. Fisher Body Div.-
Gen. Motors Corp., 481 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App. 1972); Groce v. Pyle, 315 S.W.2d
482 (Mo. App. 1958); Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966).
77. California Cas. Indern. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
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ally given to that which compensates for the services which were
extraordinary.7 8 Housekeeping duties, even though a greater bur-
den because of the special needs of the disabled employee, are in
this manner eliminated from the recovery.
7 9
Many courts consider whether a spouse gave up other employ-
ment in order to be available to provide the required nursing serv-
ices for the disabled employee.80 This factor does not appear to be
determinative. Other courts look merely at employability,81 and
some do not even reach the subject. It is odd that this factor is
ever considered when the reason for the compensation is not be-
cause of need or wages lost to the family, but rather, because of the
employer's statutory duty to provide the necessary medical serv-
ices.
The fact that the applicable statute focuses upon the nature of
the services provided rather than upon the status of the provider of
such services is also a consideration in some jurisdictions.8 2 The
417, 190 P.2d 990 (1948); Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1961);
A.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A.2d 252 (1962);
Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69, 228 N.W.2d 205 (1975); Stephens v.
Crane Trucking, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1969); Balsamo v. Fisher Body Div.-
Gen. Motors Corp., 481 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App. 1972); Groce v. Pyle, 315 S.W.2d
482 (Mo. App. 1958). But cf. Klapacs's Case, 355 Mass. 46, 242 N.E.2d 862
(1968) (services of wife were extraordinary but no compensation was allowed
because they were not medical services); Graf v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234
Minn. 485, 49 N.W.2d 797 (1951) (services of wife were extraordinary but no
compensation because no showing of expense or of employment given up).
78. South Coast Constr. Co. v. Chizauskas, 172 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1965). Cf. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. Weaver, 226 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1969) (recovery of compen-
sation for hired, unlicensed practical nurse was reduced by one-half to cover
only those services related to nursing). But cf. Pacific Elec. Ry. v. Industrial
Accident Conm'n, 96 Cal. App. 2d 651, 216 P.2d 135 (1950) (allowed recovery
for non-extraordinary duties performed by hired nurse when reason for leav-
ing hospital and hiring nurse was to reduce expense).
79. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Weaver, 226 So. 2d 801 (Fla 1969); South Coast
Constr. Co. v. Chizauskas, 172 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1965). But cf. Pacific Elec. Ry. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 96 Cal. App. 2d 651, 216 P.2d 135 (1950) (allowed
recovery for housekeeping duties performed by a hired nurse).
80. California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
417, 190 P.2d 990 (1948); Oolite Rock Co. v. Deese, 134 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1961);
Graf v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Minn. 485,49 N.W.2d 797 (1951); Stephens
v. Crane Trucking, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1969); Groce v. Pyle, 315 S.W.2d
482 (Mo. App. 1958).
81. K.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A.2d 252 (1962). Cf.
Brinson v. Southeastern Utils. Serv. Co., 72 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1954) (court deter-
mined value of wife's nursing services on basis of what it felt she could earn
outside the home).
82. A.G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A.2d 252 (1962);
Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69,228 N.W.2d 205 (1975); Groce v. Pyle,
315 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. App. 1958); Collins v. Reed-Harlin Grocery Co., 230
S.W.2d 880 (Mo. App. 1950); Daugherty v. City of Monett, 238 Mo. App. 924,192
S.W.2d 51 (1946).
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statute merely requires that "medical services" be provided. It
does not specify the qualifications of the provider or that the pro-
vider must be hired.
After reviewing the reasons for allowing recovery for nursing
services provided by a spouse, the majority opinion in Spiker com-
bined them into one holding based upon equitable considerations:
The employer-insurer should not be allowed to profit from the gratuitous
care, given out of love, to an injured employee by his spouse, when it was
the employer which forced the care of the employee upon the spouse.
I conclude from the foregoing authorities that it would be most inequi-
table not to permit an injured employee, entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion benefits under the applicable statute, to recover the value of services
rendered him by his spouse or other members of his family.
8 3
Spiker also sets out a three-prong test which must be met
before compensation for a spouse's services may be recovered.
This test had not been previously set out in any of the cases re-
viewed by the court. It appears to be merely a condensation of
some of the factors examined by other courts. Such a test is
beneficial, however. The Nebraska Supreme Court is breaking
new ground in this state by allowing compensation for nursing
services performed by a wife. Setting out a specific test for award-
ing compensation will greatly facilitate the application of the new
rule in future cases.
The court set out the test in the following words:
[T] here are three basic requirements to be satisfied before compensation
will be allowed for the care given an injured employee by the spouse in
their home. These requirements are that: (1) The employer must have
knowledge of the employee's disability and need of assistance as a result
of a work-related accident. (2) the care given by the wife must be ex-
traordinary and beyond normal household duties; and, finally (3) there
must be a means of determining the reasonable value of the services ren-
dered by the spouse. 4
The first requirement of the test, that the employer know of the
disability and the need for care, will serve several purposes. It will
insure that the employer has had an opportunity to supply the re-
quired services in some other manner. It will also provide a check
on the system and prevent possible fraud with regard to the serv-
ices actually required. This requirement may present some
problems though, if it is interpreted as an actual test rather than as
a factor to be considered. If a test, this requirement may prevent
recovery for services performed prior to the time that the employer
learns of the disability and the need for care. It may encourage an
employer to avoid learning the condition and the needs of the in-
jured employee. Neither of these possible outcomes are desirable.
83. 201 Neb. at 523, 270 N.W.2d at 311 (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 519, 270 N.W.2d at 309.
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If the requirement is construed as a factor to be considered, these
undesirable outcomes could, to a large extent, be avoided.
The value of the second prong of the test lies primarily in its
definition of compensable services performed by the wife. This
step will limit recovery to compensation for nursing services. Al-
though the first and second prongs of the test will be valuable in
the future, the third prong appears to be superfluous. This step of
the test requires that there be a means for determining the reason-
able value of the wife's services. There will always be such meth-
ods available. The court could examine the cost of equivalent care
in a hospital or nursing home. It could base the compensation on
the cost of the care if provided in the home by a professional nurse
or some other medically trained person who had been hired to per-
form the required services. The inclusion of this portion of the test
will add little to the value and effectiveness of the test.85 Despite
its formulation of the test, the court held that "[t] he plaintiff is en-
titled to an award for the reasonable value of the nursing care fur-
nished to him by Mrs. Spiker while he was cared for at home
.... "86 without discussing whether the test's requirements were
met.
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice White8 7 objected to the
overruling of Claus v. DeVere:88 "[A] rule of such established
standing, interpreting the statute, should not be reversed except
after a full hearing and examination in the legislative forum."8 9 It
is probable that the issue has not yet reached the legislative forum
because the workmen's compensation insurance carriers, in the in-
terest of reducing expenses, have voluntarily paid compensation
for the services provided by a spouse rather than pay the entire
expense of continued hospital care, nursing home care or profes-
sional nursing care. Any of these options would undoubtedly cost
more than it would cost the insurer to reasonably compensate the
spouse for services provided. If this payment had not been volun-
tarily provided for so many years, it is likely that many spouses,
rather than providing the services "gratuitously" would hire a
trained nurse to perform the same functions. White also com-
mented: "Every wife now becomes a nurse - and a paid one....
And the wedding vow 'to care for him, in sickness and health' be-
85. A bill has been introduced in the Nebraska Legislature to limit a spouse's
compensation for nursing services to $100 per week. L.B. 447, 86th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1979). This limitation would appear inadvisable since it would discour-
age nursing professionals from providing care for a disabled spouse rather
than working outside the home.
86. 201 Neb. at 512, 270 N.W.2d at 305.
87. Id. at 524, 270 N.W.2d at 311.
88. 120 Neb. 812, 235 N.W. 450 (1931).
89. 201 Neb. at 529, 270 N.W.2d at.313.
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comes in part, an employer's financial burden."90 However, it is
not the burden of the wedding vow which is, by this case, being
placed upon the employer. The services performed by Mrs. Spiker
were not the type of services normally provided for one spouse by
the other. They were not the services normally considered to fall
within the obligations of the wedding vow. These services were
extraordinary; they were the kind of services generally provided
by a trained, professional nurse. The only burden placed upon the
employer by Spiker is that which was placed on him many years
ago by the Workmen's Compensation Act-the duty to provide or
pay for all reasonable medical expenses.
V. CONCLUSION
The Spiker court correctly decided that medical expenses were
to be paid by the employer even when the treatment could not rea-
sonably be expected to cure the disabled employee or send him
speedily along the road to recovery. The Act 9 ' has never been so
limited and the time was right for the court to recognize this and
give to the disabled employee all that is due. It was also time for
the court to give to the employee openly what it had in the past
given only very discreetly.
92
This decision, however, does raise some interesting questions.
After Spiker, will an employer be required to continue payment for
psychiatric treatments when they are said to be necessary to main-
tain the mental condition of the employee but there is little hope of
improvement? If so, is there a standard as to the level at which the
mental condition must be maintained? Also, to what limits must
an employer go in providing medical treatment if it is apparent
that the disabled employee's condition is deteriorating? Must the
newest techniques and treatments be provided at all costs? As a
result of Spiker, these issues will have to be resolved either in fu-
ture cases or by statute.
The court was also correct in ordering the employer to compen-
sate the disabled employee for the nursing services provided by
the employee's wife. The Act clearly has not precluded such com-
pensation. This decision does not transfer a legal or marital obliga-
tion from the wife to the employer. It merely compensates the
90. Id. at 530, 270 N.W.2d at 314.
91. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1974) (amended 1978).
92. Shotwell v. Industrial Builders, Inc., 187 Neb. 320, 190 N.W.2d 624 (1971); Gil-
more v. State, 146 Neb. 647,20 N.W.2d 918 (1945).
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wife who has been forced to, or because of economic considera-
tions agrees to, fulfill an obligation of the employer-the obligation
to provide medical services.
Suzanne K. Loseke '79
